Policing the Peace after Yugoslavia: Police Reform between External Imposition and Domestic Reform by BIEBER Florian & University of Kent, United Kingdom







Policing the Peace after Yugoslavia: 















Prepared for the GRIPS State-Building Workshop 2010: Organizing Police Forces in 






Since the mid-1990s, a plethora of international organizations—from the UN and OSCE to 
the European Union and NATO—have been extensively involved in the reform of police 
forces across the post-conflict regions of former Yugoslavia. The various international actors 
have employed a diverse tool kit of police reform, from creating new police forces from 
scratch to reforming existing, ethnically divided forces.  
This paper will trace the different efforts in post-conflict settings by discussing policing by 
international actors, efforts at imposing police reform, post-conflict police assistance and 
change to policing through conditionality, drawing on the rich empirical record from Croatia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Despite these extensive efforts, the 
results have been modest. Lacking clear international or European standards, police reform 
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Police Forces across Central and Southeastern Europe have experienced a 
fundamental transformation since the fall of Communism over two decades ago. The 
transition from authoritarian single-party rule to multiparty democracy necessitated a 
profound change of the police: enforcing the rule of law, protecting human rights and 
not viewing citizens as potential threats and subordinates.3 New challenges arose in 
addition, such as organized crime, often linked to political power centers, 
discrimination of minorities (esp. Roma) and political violence. This plethora of needs 
which drove police reform in Central and Southeastern Europe has been compounded 
by the large scale violence which most countries emerging from Yugoslavia 
experienced in the process of the wars of Yugoslav succession.  
Police forces during the wars and conflicts were often the main source of violence, 
discrimination and ‘ethnic cleansing’. They were not embodying the ‘monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force by the state’: Run by states against minorities, by secessionists 
against other ethnic groups and political opponents, being not legitimate, holding no 
monopoly over the use of force, they became subservient to new nationalist political 
elites and their ranks swelled with paramilitaries who had little or no understanding of 
policing. The Serbian police included for example the notorious Unit for Special 
Operations (Jedinica za specijalne operacije, JSO), also know as Red Berets, which 
included members of paramilitary units from Croatia and Bosnia and committed war 
crimes in all three wars and whose members assassinated Serbian Prime Minister 
Zoran Djindjić in March 2003. The police in Serbia as an example for one of the most 
politicized police forces in the region was directly controlled by president Slobodan 
Milošević until his fall in 2000 and served as his praetorian guard against domestic 
dissent and was a key actor in ethnic cleansing in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo during 
the wars.4 
For their central role during the conflicts police reform has been understood to be a 
pillar of post-conflict reconstruction, not only in former Yugoslavia, but also in other 
ethnic and civil conflicts from Northern Ireland to Sudan. The reforms which are 
initiated in the post-conflict period have to meet six particular challenges. Firstly, they 
need to penalize and ideally remove police officers who have been involved in serious 
breaches of human rights during the conflict. Second, former combatants need to 
transition to civilian jobs and police forces are often the obvious employers. Third, 
police forces need to be made more representative of the larger population 
composition, which in most cases entails increasing the share of minority members in 
the police force. Fourth, police reform is necessary in order to allow for the return of 
minorities and to provide a secure environment in which democratic elections can 
take place. Fifth, police reform is inherently political and often controversial as the 
structure of the police reinforces the political structures after the war. These 
institutions, such as regional autonomy, are often integral part of the peace settlement. 
Finally, the policing practice needs to be professionalized and reformed. While all 
aspects seek to transform police forces from a cause of conflict to a legitimate 
                                                 
3  Robert I. Mawby, “The Impact of Transition: A Comparison of Post-Communist Societies with 
Earlier ‘Societies in Transition,’  András Kádár (ed.), Police in Transition (Budapest: Central European 
University Press, 2001) pp. 23-31. 
4 On the structure of the Serbian police during the 1990s see Budimir Babović, Analysis of Regulations 
Regarding Responsibility for Control of the Interior Ministry of the Republic Serbia, 2.4.2003. Exhibit 
465, Case IT-02-54-T, Slobodan Milošević, ICTY. 
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representative of an inclusive state to maintain peace, the different priorities often pull 
the reform efforts into contradictory directions.  
International intervention in the form of assistance, advice, policing, mentoring, 
training, enforcement and coercion shaped the evolution of post-conflict policing in 
former Yugoslavia. It is this international intervention into policing that is the focus of 
this paper. This does not include general assistance and advice provided to state 
authorities in conducting policing or reforming the police, but more concerted 
external intervention, focusing particularly on the post-conflict environment. In 
particular, we will focus on four aspects of international intervention in police reform 
which will be discussed in detail: First, we will look at international policing, where 
international organizations exercised executive policing functions and re-build police 
forces from scratch. Second, we will explore externally imposed police reforms, i.e 
when changes to the police structure are primarily driven by external actors, even if 
they are formally implemented by local institutions. These two first forms of external 
intervention are particular to the (semi-)protectorates in Kosovo and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where international actors have held a broad range of competences. 
Third, we will discuss short-term post conflict assistance which includes measures 
that have assisted governments to reform police forces in response to a conflict, as has 
been the case in Southern Serbia and Macedonia. Finally, we will explore how 
conditionality of the European Union has sought to facilitate the reform of police 
forces, taking the example of Bosnia.  
In addition to the European Union, most international intervention in the context of 
policing have been carried out by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations. Beyond these three core actors, bilateral 
donors have shaped the police reform agenda, as has NATO, which through a lead 
role in peace-keeping has often held executive police competences, in particular 
through the KFOR mission in Kosovo.  
As we shall see, the record of this experience has been mixed. While conflicts have 
ended, bloated militarized police forces have become more professional and inclusive, 
political influence remains strong. Furthermore, external intervention has been 
struggling to convince local authorities to ‘buy into’ the reform processes. As such, 
police reform has shared greater similarities with other aspects of public 
administration reform, rather than defense reform which has generally been more 
successful due to clearer standards of armed forces and the lead role of NATO in the 
process.5 In particular, there has been a frequent disconnect between the emphasis on 
technical assistance by external actors and the political relevance of police forces and 
the content of the reform process.  
 
1. International Policing 
International policing constitutes the highest degree of external imposition. It 
encompasses both an executive role for international police officers, including the 
power to arrest citizens, and the complete reconstruction of a new local police force. 
Despite extensive external involvement in policing, international police officers have 
only actively conducted policing in Kosovo and in Eastern Slavonia. The rarity of 
such extensive external involvement, including beyond the Western Balkans, is hardly 
                                                 
5 On this for Bosnia see the research project of the author and Gülnur Aybet on EU and NATO state-
building in Bosnia, http://intbosnia.wordpress.com/. 
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surprising. States are unlikely to complete relinquish one of its core functions and 
international actors are generally ill-prepared to provide executive policing—from 
linguistic and cultural obstacles to the large number of international police officers 
required. In Kosovo, external policing became a necessity as after the ceasefire 
negotiated between NATO and the Yugoslav government in June 1999 all Yugoslav 
and Serbian security personal withdrew from the province, leaving a complete power-
vacuum behind in Kosovo. Due to the apartheid-style policies of Slobodan 
Milošević’s Serbia, few Albanians remained in the security forces and most Kosovo 
Serbs in the security forces were unwilling to remain in Kosovo under international 
auspices for the fear of retribution by Albanians. Thus, Kosovo lacked any state 
structures and institutions as KFOR soldiers entered the region. However, KFOR 
soldiers competed against the Kosovo Liberation Army which also sought to fill the 
vacuum created by the Serbian state withdrawal.6 In this environment, policing was 
first carried out by peacekeepers with little training and capacities in regular police 
duties. As a consequence, KFOR was unable to prevent large scale revenge attacks 
against Serbs and other minorities by radical Albanians, taking the lives of up to a 
thousand persons during the summer of 1999 and the expulsion of a majority of Serbs 
and most Roma from Kosovo.7 
Prior to the establishment of an international police force in Kosovo, the only regional 
experience with an international police force and the complete reconstruction of a 
police force had been in Eastern Slavonia. Eastern Slavonia was the eastern most 
region of Croatia bordering Serbia and the only part of the self-declared mini-state of 
the Republic of Serbian Krajina left in the fall of 1995 after the successful Croatian 
military operations Flash (Bljesak) and Lightening (Oluja). The region came under 
temporary international administration in late 1995 through the Erdut Agreement 
which foresaw the reintegration of the region into Croatia. While the Croatian Serb 
authority had not disappeared, as the Serbian state had in Kosovo, the overwhelming 
military victory of the Croatian state elsewhere placed the local Serb authorities in 
weak bargaining position. As a result, the local Serb forces, including the police 
which emerged out of paramilitary units during the Croat war in 1991/2, were 
disbanded and the entire region demilitarized. 8  In its place, the UN mission 
established the Transitional Authority Police Force (TAPF), a multiethnic police that 
was formed with assistance from the Croat state institutions and the local Serb 
authorities with rough parity of Serbs and Croats.9 The TAPF eventually consisted of 
811 Serb, 815 Croat officers and 52 from other ethnic groups. The force was trained 
by the UN who also maintained observers in all local police stations. In addition, a 50 
person special international police unit existed in parallel with the local police, 
established under UN mandate.10 They were forced to accept an executive role for the 
UN mission in the region (UNTAES) which would oversee the reintegration of the 
region in Croatia. The international police was in Eastern Slavonia was able to make 
some high-profile arrests during the UN mandate, but never played more than an 
                                                 
6 Tim Judah, Kosovo. What Everyone needs to know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 93. 
7  Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories. Rule and Reconstruction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 46, 49. 
8  Art. 3, Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, 
12.11.1995. 
9 Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, “Distinct and Different: The transformation of the Croatian Police,” Marina 
Caparini, Otwin Mareni (eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe. Process and 
Progress (Geneva and Münster: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Lit 
Verlag, 2004), p. 206. 
10 Ibid, p. 46. 
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auxiliary role to the reforms of the local police force. By December 1997 the 
responsibility over the police was transferred to Croatian government after the 
government promised to maintain the ethnic composition, but all other special 
arrangements or international involvement ended.11  
In Kosovo, the international policing slowly emerged after the entry of KFOR. The 
two main policing structures were the internationally staffed civilian police force 
(CIVPOL) and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), which was recruited locally, but 
remained under UN control until 2005.12 Local political institutions at the Kosovo-
level were only established in 2001, following the promulgation of the UN imposed 
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo that 
established the ‘Provisional Institutions of Self-Government’ (PISG) and general 
elections. Furthermore, the UN was reluctant to relinquish policing competences to 
the new authorities due to the sensitivity of policing, in particular when it came to 
retaining minority members among its ranks and protecting Serbs and minorities (esp. 
Roma) from attacks.  
The CIVPOL was the first civilian police force to take over from KFOR in the months 
following the end of the war. Unlike the KFOR, however, it was unable to deploy in 
the immediate aftermath of the war and it would take CIVPOL up to a year to reach 
its planned strength. The mission was first established with quickly transfer of 
members of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and in 1999 counted 
only 1,800 police officers. By 2000, its number had more than doubled to 4,450, at 
which level it approximately remained until 2004.13 Among the international police 
officers, approximately two thirds formed part of the CIVPOL, while the remainder 
constituted special police units and the border police.14 The reasons for the slow-build 
up of the international police mission are in part specific to Kosovo and in part 
representative of a broader problem of international police missions. UNMIK gained 
the mandate to administer the police mission only at the beginning of international 
deployment and was thus unable to plan for such a mission ahead of time.15 A general 
problem, experienced frequently with civilian missions in post-conflict intervention, 
has been the deployment gap. Civilian members to missions cannot be drawn up as 
soldiers and in particular qualified professionals are often not readily available for 
deployment. This pertains specifically to policing as few countries can spare large 
numbers of police officers. This gap has lead to often low standards among the 
international officials. Reports of the executive and non-executive UN police missions 
in Kosovo and Bosnia frequently noted that police officers were at times unable to 
speak English or even to drive—both formal requirement—or came from 
backgrounds that raised legitimate doubts over the good policing practices they might 
be bringing to the countries.16 In Kosovo, some 46 countries contributed to CIVPOL 
                                                 
11 Caplan, Op. Cit., p. 58. 
12 Jeremy M. Wilson, “Reconstruction of Kosovo’s Police and Justice Systems,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 605 (2006), p. 153.  
13 Ibid., p. 158. 
14 Human Rights Watch, Failure to Protect. Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004, Vol. 16, 
No. 6 (July 2004), p. 14. 
15 Wilson, op. cit., p. 159. 
16 Timothy Donais, “The Limits of Post-Conflict Police Reform,” Michael A. Innes (ed.), Bosnian 
Security after Dayton. 2ew Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 186; “UN Sex 
Abuse Enquiry in Kosovo,” The Scotsman, 6.6.2005; Eric Jansson, “Kosovo raises concern over UN 
staff role,” Financial Times, 16.9.2005. 
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in March 2004, with the larges contributors being from the USA, India, Germany, and 
Jordan, but also including police officers hailing from Zimbabwe.17   
In addition to providing civilian policing and to taking over these functions from 
KFOR, the international police mission had the explicit goal to prepare the transition 
to the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) that would eventually take over from CIVPOL. 
The first recruits of the KPS were already trained in 1999 and the ratio of KPS to 
CIVPOL police officers increased steadily, with KPS overtaking the number of 
international police officers by 2002. The KPS was recruited by the UN and trained 
by the OSCE in a program that be similar to later training programs in Macedonia and 
Southern Serbia, discussed below, involving 20 weeks training at a police academy 
and followed by 15 weeks of field training.18 The number of KPS police officers 
reached 5,700 in March 2004, more than twice the number of international police 
officers.19 
In recruitment UNMIK paid particular attention to secure the adequate representation 
of minorities to help not just build an inclusive police force, but also to secure the 
legitimacy of the new institutions among the Serb community that had remained 
skeptical and at time outright hostile towards these emerging Kosovo institutions. In 
this regard, KPS was successful as by 2003, 84% of its members were hailing from 
the Albanian community, 9% from Serbian background and 7% from other 
communities, slightly overrepresenting minorities. 20  This careful distribution, 
however, should not be mistaken for a multiethnic police force. As Serbs and 
Albanians in particular live in segregated areas, the police tended to reflect the local 
demographics and contain few member of a different group in any given region.21  
Despite this success in terms of minority recruitment, the KPS, together with CIVPOL 
and KFOR, however, took a serious blow to their legitimacy in March 2004 when 
three days of rioting by extremist Albanians resulted in the torching of Serb Orthodox 
churches, houses and the displacement of several thousand Serbs. The international 
presence itself became a target of the mob violence with around 60 members from 
each KFOR, CIVPOL and KPS injured. The violence and the inability of KPS to 
effectively stem the attacks revealed a number of weaknesses of the international 
police effort: the officers pay and morale was low and training and equipment for 
crowd control was limited.22 More importantly, the failure to prevent the violence 
disclosed larger structural weaknesses of international policing. Coordination within 
KFOR and between KFOR, the UN police and KPS was minimal and lines of 
authorities were confused. Similarly, none of the security providers appeared to be 
equipped and trained for large-scale crowd control and civil disturbances.23 While the 
March 2004 would not be repeated, it undermined the international presence and also 
openly challenged the UN mission altogether. With 50,000 rioters participating and 
targeting not only minorities, but also the international police and security forces, the 
honey moon between the international peace mission and the Albanian majority was 
over. 24  International executive civilian peacekeeping requires a certain degree of 
                                                 
17 For a list of participating countries, see http://www.unmikonline.org/civpol/factsfigs.htm. 
18 Wilson, op. cit., p.160. 
19 Human Rights Watch, op. cit.,  p. 14. 
20 There are no firm population numbers as no reliable census has been held in Kosovo since 1981, but 
it is generally assumed that the share of Albanians of the population of Kosovo is close to 90%. Ibid., p. 
16. 
21 Ibid., p.14 
22 Ibid., p. 15. 
23 Ibid, p. 25 
24 Ibid, p. 26. 
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popular support and legitimacy not to slide into an escalation of violence. The support 
the UN and KFOR had enjoyed in 1999 had dissipated by March 2004.25 It was this 
crisis that lead to the process which paved the way to Kosovo’s independence in 
February 2008.  
After the riots, the KPS gained in autonomy from the UN came under control of 
Kosovo authorities in 2005. Shortly before independence, the KPS had 7,124 police 
officers, 6,082 Albanians, 746 Serbs and 414 from other communities. 26  This 
distribution meant that Serbs remained part of this institution and were well 
represented. In response to the declaration of independence in 2008, however, most 
Serb officers in the KPS walked out of their jobs, coinciding with a general Serb 
boycott of Kosovo institutions.27 By July 2009 most Serb officers returned to work for 
KPS.28 During the transition towards independence and as EULEX took over from 
most policing activities from the UN, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section, the international civilian police was gradually phased out.29 The EU rule 
of law mission in Kosovo (EULEX) had been under discussion since 2005 but only 
began operating after Kosovo’s independence in 2008.30 
  
2. Internationally Imposed Police Reform 
Short of taking over executive police functions or forming a police force from scratch, 
international actors have most commonly shaped the police in post-conflict states of 
the Western Balkans through a combination of advice and imposition. International 
organizations have exercised strong control over the police particularly in Bosnia and 
in Kosovo after independence, albeit without a full executive mandate. This approach 
combines an international presence with limited executive and oversight competences 
with a functional local administration. Unlike international assistance to local 
authorities, which we will discuss next, or a direct international executive role, this 
hybrid creates inherent tensions between national and local authorities and 
international actors imposing or ‘suggesting’ particular reforms to the police force.  
Unlike international policing, the focus is not on establishing public safety and 
security, but to transform the existing police structures. These reforms are often 
focused on making the police more representative of minority groups, ensuring that 
the police protects minorities, in particular refugees returning to their homes, and to 
reducing direct political influence and police abuse.  
Probably the most substantial international effort in the region took place in Bosnia. 
Initially, the UN-lead International Police Task Force (IPTF) had equipped only a 
weak mandate to advise, monitor and observe the local police in the 1995 Dayton 
Peace Accord (Annex 11). The mission was caught between conflicting visions of the 
                                                 
25 Caplan notes how an executive police mandate was only possible due to domestic support in Kosovo 
for the international presence. Caplan, op. cit., p. 51. 
26 Judah, op. cit., p. 95. 
27  Vedran Džihić, Helmut Kramer, “Kosovo after Independence. Is the EU’s EULEX Mission 
Delivering on its Promises?” International Police Analysis, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, July 2009, p. 6. 
28 Besa Beqiri, “Kosovo Serb officers end boycott,” SEETimes, 3.7.2009. 
29 By late 2009, UN still had 8 international police officers in Kosovo as part of the Rule of Law office 
which facilitated the work of EULEX in Northern Kosovo were Serb institutions had initially refused 
to cooperated with EULEX. “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo,” UN Security Council, 30.9.2009, S/2009/497, p. 17. 
30 While numbers of the international police declined, there were still around 2,000 international police 
officers stationed in Kosovo on the eve of independence in 2008. Džihić, Kramer, op. cit., p. 8. 
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USA and the West European countries involved in defining its mission, leaving it 
“weak by a mixture of accident and design,” as Richard Caplan has argued.31 The 
impotence of IPTF became apparent in 1996 when the hand-over of Serb-held suburbs 
of Sarajevo to the Bosniak-Croat dominated Federation lead to most Serbs being 
forced out by their own authorities and large areas being burnt down under the passive 
eye of the international presence, including the fledgling IPTF.32  
The mission was staffed at its peak by 1,800 international police officers, whose task 
initially it was to monitor the work of the different local police forces, to participate in 
joint patrols, provide training and advise authorities. 33  This restrictive mandate 
reflects the broader limitation of the civilian aspects of the international mission in 
Bosnia in the first phases of the international mission. While the military presence had 
a more robust mandate and quickly established itself, the peacekeeping force IFOR, 
succeeded by SFOR in 1996, initially refrained from taking over any policing rule 
beyond conventional peace-keeping tasks, unlike KFOR in Kosovo. This was 
particularly striking in the unwillingness to arrest suspected war criminals indicted by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
Just as the mandate of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was enhanced by 
the so-called Bonn Powers to exercise executive powers in all domains of the civilian 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the IPTF received additional powers 
in the UN Security Council Resolution 1088 in1996. The resolution allowed the IPTF 
to vet police officers and to bar police officers for human rights abuses. 34 
Subsequently, IPFT officers were co-located in local police stations, which enhanced 
the international supervision of policing practices. A further result of this change of 
mandate was a large vetting program, which was facilitated by two bilateral 
agreements with each of the two entities, the first one was signed with the Federation 
in 1996 and the second with the Serb Republic (Republika Srpska, RS) in 1998. The 
IPTF both monitored the police throughout Bosnia, including participating in patrols, 
being stationed in local police stations and conducted the vetting process. This process 
was aimed reducing the high number of police officers and eliminating police officers 
from the services which had either breached human rights in service or otherwise had 
made grave misrepresentations in the vetting processes to the UN. This process 
included a test for existing police officers, confirmation that they were not publically 
indicted by the ICTY, or had a known criminal record.35 During this process, which 
was completed in a rush in 2002, the number of police officers was reduced from 
44,750 in 1995 (32,750 in the Federation and 12,000 in the RS) to 11,500 in the 
Federation and 8,500 in the RS within a few years.36 In parallel with the overall 
reduction of the number of police, the different police forces were also required to 
include members from non-dominant communities. Considering that there were 12 
territorial police forces (one for each of ten cantons of the Federation, one for the RS 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 48 
32 Louis Sell, “The Serb Flight from Sarajevo: Dayton’s First Failure.” East European Politics and 
Society, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 179–202. 
33  L. Kendall Palmer, “Police Reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina: External Pressure and Internal 
Resistance,” Marina Caparini, Otwin Mareni (eds), Transforming Police in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Process and Progress (Geneva and Münster: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces and Lit Verlag, 2004), pp. 171-172. 
34  Donais, op. cit., p. 177. See also the conclusions of the London conference of the Peace 
Implementation Council, 5.12.1996, available at http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5176 
and UN Security Council Resolution 1088 (1996),12.12.1996. 
35 Palmer, op. cit., p. 178. 
36 Ibid, p.177. 
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and one in the district of Brčko), non-dominant groups included for example Bosniaks 
and Croats in the RS, Serbs in all cantons of the Federation, but also Bosniaks in 
Croat dominated cantons and vice verso. In the 1996 agreement, the Federation 
committed itself to recruit a Serb share of the police corresponding to the pre-war 
census, setting aside 28% of posts for Serbs. The RS was unwilling to commit to the 
census result as basis for recruitment, as this would have meant that nearly half of all 
police officers were not Serbs. Instead, the turnout of non-Serbs in the first local 
elections in 1997 served as the base line, resulting in a quota of 20% reserved for non-
Serbs. The IPTF sought to recruit new minority officers by offering refresher courses 
for former police officers among IDPs and refugees, redeploying police officers to 
region of origin and new recruits.37 Despite concerted efforts by IPTF, the numbers 
remained well below the targets. The first non-Serbs only joined the RS police in 
1999 and the number had not exceeded 5% by 2002. The numbers in the Federation 
were only slightly more encouraging: In 1999 less than 1.5% of police officers were 
neither Croats or Bosniaks with the number rising to 15.5% by 2002, but still 
remaining around half of the target.38 
Although the UN Mission in Bosnia (UNMBiH) declared the police reform successful 
and the police ‘fit for Europe’, international intervention did not end.39  It would 
appear that the EU who succeeded the UN in Bosnia did not deem the police 
sufficiently ‘fit for Europe.’ The EU Police Mission (EUPM) operated with a much 
reduced foot print (400 instead of 1,800 international police officers) and a more 
limited mandate. As a result, it focused its efforts on the managerial level of the 
police. 40  EUPM was unable to de-certify police officers, but instead the 
Commissioner in charge of EUPM could recommend the dismissal of police officers 
to the OHR. Although this structure was more complex, as the dismissals by the OHR 
were not open to judicial redress, this structure resulted in great powers of the EU 
mission, despite having a formally reduced mandate.41 
In the Bosnian context two experiences stand out: Brčko and Mostar.42 In Mostar, a 
small police contingent (up to 182 international officers) of the West European Union 
(WEU) assisted the EU effort to unify the city between July 1994 and October 1996 
following the end of the conflict between the Bosnian government and Bosnian Croat 
forces. The goal of the WEU mission was to provide security and to forge a unified 
police out of the two ethnically divided police forces. In effect, when the EU and 
WEU mission ended in 1996 and handed over to the OHR and the UN, little had been 
achieved.43 The record in Brčko was more successful. Here international engagement 
was extended as the city came under full international protectorate in 1997 and an 
international arbitration transformed it into a separate district by 1999. Although the 
formal structures—the IPFT in combination with the OHR were formally the same as 
elsewhere in Bosnia, the intervention was considerably more advanced. Brčko alone, 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 180. 
38 Florian Bieber, Post-War Bosnia (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), pp.73-74, pp. 82-83. 
39 Donais, op. cit, p. 173. 
40 Palmer, op.cit. p. 190. 
41 Catriona Mace, “ESDP Goes Live: The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” European 
Security Review, No. 16, February 2003, pp. 4-6. 
42  Both cities otherwise constitute particularities in the post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia. See 
Florian Bieber, “Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brčko,” 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2005), pp. 420-433. 
43 Willem F. van Eekelen, Steven Blockmans, “European crisis management avant la lettre,” Steven 
Blockmans (ed.), The European Union and Crisis Management. Policy and Legal Aspects (The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press, 2008), pp. 47-8. 
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a small municipality, 250 international police officers were deployed, much more than 
any other region of the country. In addition, the international supervisor of district 
established a multi-ethnic police force, based on pre-existing police officers, but with 
a new structure.44 As a result, the police force of Brčko has been considerably more 
diverse and professional than in most other regions of Bosnia. Overall, however, the 
record of both the IPTF and the EUPM is widely considered to be modest. While the 
number of police officers has been drastically reduced and some human rights 
offenders were weeded out, the number of minority police officers remained 
disappointingly low and many serious human rights violators remained beyond the 
reach of the IPTF. De-certified police officers could be employed by the Ministry of 
Interiors in non-policing roles, former police officers with a problematic background 
remained part of the internal security apparatus.45 The IPTF only slowly reached its 
operating staffing (reaching its assigned capacity only in 1997) and its members have 
been criticized for low policing standards and involvement in prostitution.46  
Some of these challenges have been replicated by two similar EU police missions, 
namely the Proxima mission which assisted police reform in Macedonia between late 
2003 and late 2005 and the EULEX mission in Kosovo which formally took over 
most rule of law related competences from the UN in late 2008. 
Proxima succeeded earlier NATO and EU military missions in the aftermath of the 
2001 conflict. It aimed at promoting a “depolitized, decentralized, multi-ethnic 
police.” 47 Unlike IPTF, it lacked any ability to dismiss police officials and was mostly 
focused on monitoring police officers, being at least initially co-located with 
Macedonian police units in the regions populated by the Albanian population and 
providing advice and support to the government reform agenda. However, the 200 
member strong mission exercised considerable influence by its mere presence. 
Proxima lasted only for two years after it was forced to close down in 2005 due to 
government reservations about the impact of the mission on country’s chance of EU 
accession. Upon closing its mission, the EU handed back over to the OSCE, which 
had earlier been the lead organization on policing. A key feature and flaw of the 
Proxima mission, as Isabelle Ioannides notes, has ben the extensive infighting 
between the mission and other EU institutions in Macedonia (i.e. the EC delegation, 
the EUSR) and other international actors (OSCE, bi-laterial donors), which 
significantly undermined the mission.48  
Similar institutional infighting and uncertainty undermined the EU’s rule of law 
mission EULEX. While the mission was formally set up shortly before Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence to support Kosovo’s judiciary and police, it remained 
passive and inactive for months after independence as different EU member states 
took conflicting positions on Kosovo’s independence and a UN Security Council 
Resolution to grant the mission formal powers failed to materialize primarily due to 
Russian objections. Only a six-point plan by UN Secretary General with Serbia in late 
                                                 
44  Valery Perry, Democratic Ends and Democratic Means. Peace Implementation Strategies and 
International Intervention Options in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unpublished PhD Dissertation. George 
Mason University, 2006, pp. 172-3. 
45 Palmer, op., cit., p.179. 
46 Donais, op. cit. p. 186; Caplan, op. cit., p. 55. 
47 Isabelle Ioannides, “The EU Police Mission Proxima : Testing the ‘European’ Approach to Building 
Peace,” Agnieszka Nowak (ed.), Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way, Chaillot Paper, no. 90 
(June 2006), p. 72. 
48 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 
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2008 paved the path to the mission’s deployment.49 In exchange, it had to remain 
status-neutral, instead of supporting Kosovo’s independence as originally intended 
and operated under the framework of the 1999 Security Council Resolution 1244. In 
addition, Serb enclaves remained beyond the reach of Kosovo institutions that were 
linked only to the EU and UNMIK, but not to the Kosovo Ministry of Interior or 
Justice. The compromise with Belgrade undermined the legitimacy of EULEX in the 
eyes of many Albanians and raised the prospect of similar challenges as EUPM had 
faced in Bosnia and UNMIK in Kosovo. EULEX reached its full operation strength of 
2,569 (1,651 international and 918 local staff) by April 2009. Unlike Proxima, the 
mission holds some executive powers, 50  however even beyond its mandate, the 
limited sovereignty of Kosovo grants international actors significant informal 
powers.51 It primary executive roles is to act as a second line of defense in case of 
serious incidents, i.e. if the Kosovo Police Service is unable to resolve the incident 
and before KFOR becomes involved. Another particularity of EULEX in comparison 
to other police missions is its broader mission which includes police, justice and 
customs. In particular the link between support for police, prosecutors and judges 
marks a more comprehensive understanding of police reform than other regional 
efforts.52 
   
3. Short-term Post-Conflict Police Reform 
A less intrusive form of international assistance than discussed in the previous section 
is a set of measures to address the ethnic composition of the police in the post-conflict 
context. Generally speaking, police forces tend to be unrepresentative of the wider 
population in the immediate aftermath of conflict. In particular minorities, especially 
if they were party to the conflict, are usually reduced to a few token representatives, if 
at all. This challenge was confronted by all police forces across the region, and thus 
constituted a core feature of all international efforts in former Yugoslavia. However, 
in two cases, Macedonia and Serbia, the international engagement was less sustained 
and intrusive. A particular challenge of increasing the number of police officers from 
minority communities is the tension with some long-term reform goals. The quick 
increase of minority members in the police force often does not facilitate the 
professionalism of the police, but might crucially enhance the legitimacy of the police 
which takes priority in an environment of low trust after conflict.  
These challenges were particularly pertinent in Southern Serbia and Macedonia, 
which experienced two low-scale ethnic insurgencies in 2001. Two interlinked 
Albanian rebel movements, the National Liberation Army (UÇK) and the Liberation 
Army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bunjanovac (UÇPMB), launched attacks against 
Macedonian and Serbian security forces in 2001 and 2000 respectively. The UÇK 
sought for greater rights of Albanians in Macedonia, including quotas for Albanians 
and a greater role in the government. While it also argued for territorial autonomy or 
federalism, it abandoned this agenda in the face of international opposition. The 
                                                 
49  The plan is contained in “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo,” UN Security Council, 24.11.2008, S/2008/692.. Available at: 
http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2008/692&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC. 
50 See Council Joint Action, of 4.2.2008, on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, 
EULEX Kosovo, 2008/124/CFSP, 16.2.2008. 
51 Džihić, Kramer, op. cit., p. 15. 
52 EULEX report to the UN, 17.3.2009, available at: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?id=8&n=81. 
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UÇPMB sought to detach the three Albanian inhabited municipalities from Serbia to 
join a future independent Kosovo. Unlike the wars in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, 
these conflicts did not escalate and the number of victims remained small. The 
settlement in both cases included an important component of police reform which 
would sought to improve the participation of minorities in the police force.  
In Serbia, the Ćović plan—named after the Serbian deputy Prime Minister Nebojša 
Čović who took a lead role in negotiating and implementing the agreement—was put 
forth by the Serbian government with assistance of NATO and the OSCE brought the 
conflict to an end, and received broad international financial support.53 Police reform 
was one of four core aspects of the strategy to end the conflict, together with 
economic development, increasing the employment of Albanians in public 
administration and publically owned enterprises, as well as the introduction of Serbian 
security forces in the five kilometer buffer zone around Kosovo that had been 
previously de-militarized and became a staging ground for the UÇPMB.  
In Macedonia, the conflict ended through the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
negotiated between the largest Macedonian and Albanian parliamentary parties under 
NATO and EU auspices in August 2001. As in Serbia, police reform and in particular 
the proportional representation of Albanians in the police force constitutes a core 
pillar of the agreed reforms. 54 
In the initial phases in both Macedonia and Serbia, the lead international organization 
for police reform was the OSCE, which had established missions in both countries.  In 
Serbia, the OSCE trained police officers in a three-stage model. Very short five day 
and five week courses were aimed at former police officers, including Albanians 
which had been dismissed or resigned during the Milošević era. These refresher 
courses sought to quickly signaling change in the region and to build confidence in 
the immediate aftermath of the conflict and were based on training equal numbers of 
Albanians and Serbs with a total of 80 police offices receiving training. The more 
sustained third pillar of OSCE-organized police training focused on the establishment 
of a new multiethnic local police force. The training was directed at former UÇPMB 
fighters without a criminal record and civilians, in particular Albanians. In addition, 
current police officers also received training. Of the 375 persons trained in the first 
year, nearly two thirds were Albanians (239) and most of the remainder Serbs and two 
Roma.55 By late 2003, Albanians constituted a similar proportion of (270 of 430) 
police officers in the three municipalities.  
As a short term post-conflict program, it did not result in a permanent mechanism to 
recruit, promote and retain Albanian police officers and more then two years after the 
of the conflict, the number of Albanians in the police still remained well below the 
population share, in particular in Preševo were Albanians constitute an overwhelming 
majority of  89.1%.56 Similarly, the local police units were often overshadowed by the 
special police unit Žandarmerija—a militarized police unit based on the model of the 
Italian Carabinieri. Contentious police operations are carried out by the Žandarmerija 
rather than the local multiethnic police and the highly visible and armed appearance of 
                                                 
53  The plan was officially know as the Program and Plan for the resolution of the crisis in the 
municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa and was passed by the Federal Yugoslav 
Government in February 2001.  Koordinaciono telo za opštine Preševo, Bujnaovac i Medveđa, 
Program i Plan rešavanja krize u opštinama Preševo, Bujanovac i Medveđa, 8.2.2001. 
54 Framework Agreement, 13.8.2001.  
55 OSCE Mission to FRY, Assisting Police Reform in FRY. Ensuring a Coordinated Approach, Vienna, 
9-10.2002, p. 5-7. http://www.osce.org/documents/fry/2002/10/111_en.pdf. 
56 Marijana Trivunovic, “Status of Police Reform after Four Years of Democratic Transition in Serbia,” 
Helsinki Monitor, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2004), p. 174. 
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the unit in the region has been a source of contention between the Serbian state and 
the Albanian minority ever since 2001.57 Similarly police officers who had served in 
Kosovo during the conflict in 1998/9 had retained their posts in the region, which has 
heightened tensions.58 
The police reform in Macedonia after the end of the conflict shared many features 
with the experience in South Serbia. The goal of the international engagement in 
Macedonia, first led by the OSCE, which has had a Spill-over mission in the country 
since 1992, was two-fold: first to increase minority confidence and participation in the 
police force and second, to allow for a return of the ‘state’ to regions which had been 
controlled by the Albanian insurgents. As in Southern Serbia, the priority of the 
OSCE engagement was the rapid increase of Albanians (and to a lesser degree other 
minority members) in the police force. The OSCE thus trained 1,000 non-Macedonian 
police officers by July 2003 and supported efforts by the government to make the 
police force representative of the population composition by 2004. 59 By 2006, the 
number of Albanians in the police force had increased to 16% from 2% prior to the 
conflict, a dramatic increasing in a short period of time, but still well below the 
population share.60 In particular in the higher ranks of the police hierarchy, only few 
non-Macedonians were represented, well below the proportional representation aimed 
for.61 In a first step, the OSCE organized brief 12 week training courses, followed by 
six months field training for mostly new Albanian police officers to boost the number 
of non-Macedonian police officers by 500 in the first year after the end of the conflict. 
In addition to recruiting minority police officers, the OSCE also dispatched police 
advisors and confidence building monitors to ‘crisis areas’ to assist at restoring trust 
between the police and estranged Albanian communities.62 
Despite the ambitious goals of international intervention and a largely cooperative 
local government, the transformation of the police has been slow and cumbersome. 
Not only did the minority representation in the police not research the share in the 
general population, but other aspects lagged behind. A new police law which would 
allow the election of police chiefs by local authorities was only passed in 2006 and 
not according to the Badinter voting principle that requires not just majority consent, 
but also a support of a majority of all minority community MPs. Furthermore, the law 
was not implemented for well over year after being passed.63 
In both Serbia and Macedonia, the interethnic conflict triggered first a localized and 
minority-focused police reform, but the international engagement led to reform 
                                                 
57 International Crisis Group, “Southern Serbia’s Fragile Peace,” European Report, No. 152, 9.12.2003, 
pp.  18-19, available at: 
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58 Mark Downes, “Police Reform in Serbia, Towards the Creation of a Modern and Accountable Police 
Service,” Law Enforcement Department, OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro, January 2004, p. 
71 
59 Darko Lesja, “Community based policing in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” Helsinki 
Monitor, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2004), p. 187. See also Annex C, 5.3. Framework Agreement, 13.8.2001. 
60  Frosina Cvetkovska, “Row frustrates Albanian equality efforts,” Institute on War and Peace 
Reporting Report, 23.8.2006. 
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initiatives which had a broader scope, encompassing the entire policing sector.64 
While this expansion could be considered a form of ‘mission creep’ it more accurately 
reflects two aspects which emerged during the initial police reform focused on 
interethnic relations. First, without structural changes to the police, including a broad 
reform agenda to emphasize community policing, modern policing methods and 
human rights, the inclusion of minority members in the police force is unlikely to shift 
the overall relationship between the state and its citizens, including its minorities. 
Second, expanding the remit of reform has been an effective strategy particularly in 
Macedonia to secure broad popular support, as measures only focused on improving 
interethnic relations are often viewed by citizens from minority communities as 
privileging minorities over majorities. 
 
4. Police through Conditionality 
The latest form of international intervention in the structure of policing in the Western 
Balkans has been through the policy of conditionality of the European Union. The EU 
had acted as a donor for numerous police reform initiatives in the region, in particular 
through the assistance programs of the European Commission, such as PHRARE and 
later CARDS. However, it only became a key player in the field in 2002/3. First, the 
EU, as noted above, took over the UN police mission in Bosnia, followed by the EU 
police mission in Macedonia. These efforts followed the established pattern of post-
conflict assistance and the particular nature of the European Union and its offer of 
membership to the countries of the Western Balkans initially had little impact on the 
nature of these missions. However, in Bosnia, the thrust of police reform after 2003 
was driven not by the EU Police Mission, but by political conditionality of the EU, 
supplemented by pressure of the Office of the High Representative.  
As neither IPTF and even less the EUPM were able to impose a structural reform of 
the police sector and no such reform was foreseen in the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
any further reforms had to take a different point of departure. The reforms, however, 
were deemed necessary by both the OHR and the EU due the high administrative cost 
of policing, the lack of coordination between the different police authorities and the 
close links to ethnonationalist power structures.65 EU accession provided for a starting 
point to pursue further reform: The rule of law constitutes an integral aspect of the 
enlargement process and both human rights and a functional democracy became a 
core requirement for all future EU member states at the Copenhagen summit in 1993. 
Modernizing and reforming the police was thus on the EU agenda in view of its 
enlargement to the Western Balkans. The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) 
and the subsequent Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with countries of 
the region did not initially entail any particular direction these reforms should take. 
However, in the case of Bosnia, the tool of the SAA would become a key engine—
albeit ultimately leading to failure—for police reform. Police reform became part of 
the international effort to reduce the vast competences of the entities to promote a 
viable central state. In parallel, the entity armies were gradually reduced and 
eventually replaced by a state level army, similarly security services and border 
control shifted from entity to state control after 2000. Lacking a foundation in the 
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Dayton Peace Agreement, Paddy Ashdown, High Representative from 2002 to 2006, 
encouraged the European Commission to set police reform as a requirement for 
signing an SAA. In parallel the OHR established a Police Restructuring Commission 
which was to draft a plan for police reform under the chairmanship of the former 
Belgium Prime Minister Winfried Martens. As the commission was under pressure to 
propose a police reorganization where financial and legislative oversight would rest 
solely with the state and police regions would cut across the entity boundaries, the 
Commission’s works was rejected by the Serb Republic which jealously guarded its 
autonomy. This conflict resulted in the failure of the Commissions proposal to be 
mutually accepted and a protracted conflict between the OHR and EU on one side and 
the Serb Republic on the other hand. 
As the European Union set three criteria in regard to police reform as conditions for 
signing the SAP, police reform continued to dominate debates in Bosnia until 2008. 
The EU insisted in its conditionality that 
 
 “i) all legislative and budgetary competencies for all police matters must be vested at 
the state level, ii) no political interference with operational policing and iii) functional 
local police areas must be determined by technically policing criteria where 
operational command is exercised at the local level.”66  
 
Conceptually, conditionality offers a strong incentive for reform, not just in the 
domain of policing: support for EU membership runs high in the Western Balkans and 
conditionality has been used effectively by the EU to induce reform in the first two 
rounds of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. What set police reform 
apart from other forms of conditionality, however, was the basis for these conditions. 
The EU lacks an acquis communitaire for police matters as these remain firmly within 
the remit of member states. As a result, the EU could not draw on specific 
requirements, in particularly not in regard to the structure of the police. For example, 
in its informal guidelines for future member states on the administrative structures 
required to implement the acquis and thus join the EU, the police is scarcely 
mentioned, and mostly limited to requiring an “accountable, reliable and effective 
police organisation, which co-operates fully internally, is essential for adequate 
implementation of the acquis related to cooperation in the field of Justice, freedom 
and security, and in particular for the fight  against organised crime and new types of 
crime.”67  These vague principles stood in contrast with the specific requirements 
spelled out for Bosnia, compounded by the fact that numerous member states 
organized their police forces in structures which differ noticeably from those proposed 
by the EU for Bosnia.  
Repeated efforts by three High Representatives were unable to successfully usher the 
police reform through and instead police reform slowed down not only EU accession, 
but other aspects of political reform. While Bosnian elites repeatedly reaffirmed their 
broad commitment to police reform, all concrete efforts came to naught. In April 2008, 
the Bosnian parliament passed two police reform laws, but they effectively retained 
the decentralized police structures and only created additional weak supervisory 
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institutions at the state level without much real power. The laws additional link all 
further police reforms to the constitutional changes which are arguably even more 
contested than changes to the police structure. The watered down version of police 
reformed allowed Bosnia to sign the SAA with the EU in June 2008 and essentially 
meant that the EU had backed down from its initial conditions. This failure of 
conditionality was a clear consequence of the lack of clear EU standards which it 
could have been legitimately upheld in Bosnia and the lack of commitment of the EU 
to the standards it had set in conjunction with the OHR.  
The failure also links to some of the difficulties with other aspects of externally 
imposed police reform: Without the commitment of domestic political elites to 
reforms, changes are unlikely to occur or will remain superficial. The ‘carrot’ of EU 
accession was not large enough for Bosnian elites who know of the distance toward 
EU membership and the importance of policing for their own power. It would be 
mistaken to consider police reform through conditionality altogether impossible, but 





As this paper has demonstrated, there have been numerous efforts of international 
organizations and other third parties to shape, reform and change policing in former 
Yugoslavia. These efforts have lasted from a few months to over a decade and 
continue in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. The challenges underpinning the efforts 
are common to most aspects of post-conflict peace and state building.  
First, how can reforms be successfully pursued against the will of local domestic 
political elites? Even when international actors engage in policing directly, local elites 
matter and can make and break such a policing effort. More importantly, long term 
reforms cannot be imposed externally: laws might be imposed, but their 
implementation inherently has to result from the political commitment of domestic 
actor. Support has, however, but often lacking or remained lukewarm.  
Second, international organizations frequently display structural weaknesses in 
effectively engaging in civilian peace-building missions. The deployment gap has 
been particularly noticeable in the case of the different police missions. The delay in 
building up missions is not just a case of wasting time, it results in international 
organizations missing the ‘golden hour’ when security provision or assistance in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict sets the tone for the long-term evolution of the post-
conflict reconstruction project. For example, if criminal groups are able to take hold in 
this period, it become more difficult later on to undo their influence. The lack of 
security in Kosovo during the crucial months following NATO victory has shaped 
relations between Albanians and Serbs until today, created the enclave structure into 
which Serbs withdrew and undermined trust of Serbs and other minorities in the 
effective security provision and guarantees by NATO and other international 
organizations.  
Third, the often intrusive approach of external actors in domestic security provision 
can certainly be seen as being benign in intent, but it can also undermine not just 
citizen trust in the state which is instead placed in external security providers. It also 
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creates new power-relations which links citizens to external actors. 68  More 
importantly, it is often unclear what agenda international police missions pursue. Most 
missions and international actors for example note the prevention of terrorism (after 
2001) and drug smuggling as key priorities.69 These main concerns, however, appear 
to be driven by Western perceptions of the Western Balkans and more importantly by 
Western needs rather than domestic policing demands. While drugs have increasingly 
been posing a problem in the region itself, the prime risk perception of external 
intervention derives from the regions function as a transit route from drug producing 
countries to Western Europe. Similarly there has been little domestic terrorism, but 
the fear of terrorism fueled by extremist Islamist groups is primarily a concern for 
Western governments. In fact, the rule of law and Western fear of terrorism might in 
fact clash, as they did in Bosnia when the government was pressured by the US in 
early 2002, following 11 September 2001, to surrender six Algerian-born Bosnian 
citizens to Guantanamo without due process in Bosnia itself.70 
Fourth, “there is no agreement on what the standards of a democratic police system 
are.”71 As such, police reform does not have on clear goal and is rather about hitting a 
moving target. Consequently, international efforts have pushed countries in the region 
in very different directions: Macedonia had to decentralize the police after 2001, 
granting more power to municipalities, while Bosnia has been pressured to centralize 
and reduce the powers of sub-state units. These trends are not necessarily a 
contradiction: Macedonia’s police force before 2001 was highly centralized while 
Bosnia’s police was arguably too decentralized, lacking enough mechanisms for 
coordination across cantonal and entity boundaries. The absence of a clear standard 
has, however, undermined the EU’s conditionality over police reform in Bosnia and 
also expresses itself in a variety of approaches chosen by different countries. Practice 
varies greatly from unarmed British police officers to paramilitary policy units in Italy.  
Finally, reform of the police by international actors pose competing and at times 
contradictory demands on domestic actors. In both Macedonia and Bosnia, for 
example, reforms sought to reduce the overall number of police officers to bring the 
proportion to the population in line with European standards. At the same time, both 
countries had to increase the number of minority members in the police force. 
Similarly the push for rapid recruitment of minority members in Macedonia and South 
Serbia stood in conflict with the goal of a professionalization of the police as the short 
term training programs hardly provided for a sufficient education for a police officer. 
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